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The accidental tourists: Brexit and its toxic employment underpinnings 
Chris Warhurst 
 
Sureties and surprises 
On 23 June 2016, on a turnout of 72.2 percent of those eligible to vote, a small majority (51.9% vs 
48.1%) in UK’s EU referendum voted to leave the European Union (EU). UK people will now no 
longer be citizens of the EU but tourists and visitors to it. We should be clear however: it was an 
accidental exit. The EU Referendum was called to appease what former 1990s Conservative Prime 
Minister John Major called ‘the bastards’, a large faction of his own party for whom it’s been a 
lifelong mission to force the Conservative Party to lead the UK out of the EU. Some wanted exit 
because they hate the EU and its perceived regulations; others because they pine for an imagined 
imperialist past. They were a problem within the Conservative Party then and continued to be so 
when Cameron became Conservative Party leader in the 2005. At that point, Cameron appealed to 
the party to park the issue, arguing with good reason after 13 years in opposition that a party 
divided was a party that was unelectable. The bastards understood and held back, appeased with 
the promise of a referendum but which was denied to them by their Liberal Democrat partners in 
the Coalition Government of 2010-15. Cameron maintained his promise entering the 2015 general 
election, though doubted that he’d win the election and so thought that he’d never have to make 
good his promise. The surprise of outright victory but with a very slim majority meant that he had to 
deliver on it or face five years of sniping and rebellion from his backbenchers. With the Labour Party 
in disarray the danger was that the (un)official opposition would be his own party. 
However Brexit wasn’t the intended outcome of the UK referendum on its EU membership. The 
government led by Cameron only triggered the Referendum because it thought that it would win it. 
Sometimes called the lucky Prime Minister, Cameron thought that his good luck with referenda 
would continue. He had fought two previously and won – first managing to prevent the introduction 
of a new voting system in UK general elections and, second, blocking Scottish independence and the 
break-up of Britain. In both cases he had help: in the first, in 2011, he had a hapless opponent in his 
Coalition partner the Liberal Democrats, in the second, in 2014, he had the support of a popular, 
leading Labour politician.  This third time, luck again seemed to be with Cameron. Even as the 2016 
referendum campaign started, the Leave camp was divided; there was, for example, no clear, agreed 
leader either within the Conservative Party or across the other parties. Moreover there was no 
opposition to the Government’s position from Labour; it too supported Remain. The UK Government 
therefore seemed to have a clear field to accompany its clear position: to campaign officially and 
strongly for Remain. Moreover it was able to publicly muster business and political heavy-weights to 
its cause. Even US President Obama waded in to help.  
As became clear post-referendum, neither the Remain nor Leave camps seriously thought that the 
UK would vote anything other than Remain. The only issue was the margin of victory; a small margin 
might trigger a leadership challenge by the Brexiteers to Cameron as Conservative Party leader. 
Neither camp had any plans in place should the UK vote to leave. For the Government there was no 
Plan B and for Brexiteers there was no Plan A. Only in the aftermath of the defeat has the UK 
Government belatedly begun to think about what to do and how to do it, and then only slowly, 
refusing, most obviously, to even trigger the process of exit through Article 50 as Cameron stated 
that he would during the campaign if the Government lost. Little wonder that the result was such a 
shock in Westminster.  
How it happened – the toxic employment mix  
Much has been made of a disconnect between Westminster and those who voted to leave as a key 
reason underpinning the result and the Government’s miscalculation. There is some truth in this 
claim. Whilst much has been mad about older voters wanting to leave, the largest ratio by 
demographic was for the lowest skilled, voting 70% to 30% to leave (with an almost inverse ratio for 
the highest skilled voters, 32% vs 68%).i 
 Although the government argued an economic case for staying in the EU, that case was based on 
the price of exiting. ‘The UK,’ Chancellor George Osborne declared, ‘would be permanently poorer if 
it left the EU’ (2016: 9). His and the Governments widely publicised claim that every family in the UK 
would be £4300 worse off if the UK left the EU was the obvious example. What Osborne couldn’t say 
what that those same families were already being penalised financially as a result of the 
Government’s prolonged pursuit of austerity. As such the current price being paid by many of those 
same families because of government policy was not acknowledged. For the same reason it could it 
make a positive case for staying in the EU by acknowledging that countries such as Germany and 
France that epitomised the ‘new Europe’ had fared relatively well during the global economic crisis 
without resorting to prolonged austerity. By contrast, although some (often knowingly spurious) 
financial case was made for leaving the EU, the Brexiteers’ real dog-whistle issue was im/migration 
into the UK.UKIP’s now infamous poster portraying migrants on the march was merely a pictorial 
condensing of the argument. On this issue the Government was vulnerable. It too had long 
proclaimed it to be a problem in need of control and reduction. However, over six years in power, it 
had failed to do so. It tried to avoid the issue during the referendum, leaving the Brexiteers’ claims 
mostly unchallenged. The result was a toxic mix that resonated with the experience of the low-paid: 
continuing austerity with mass im/migration. 
The impact of austerity is felt in many areas of life in the UK, one being employment. Since the crisis, 
the UK’s employment rate has risen but real wages have fallen. Over 2007-15 the drop has been 
10.4%   – the worst, along with Greece, amongst the leading OECD countries. Over the same period 
in Germany real wages have risen 23%. The OECD average is 6.7% growth (TUC 2016). Moreover by 
2015 around 20 per cent of jobs in the UK paid less than the voluntary living wage – then set at £9.15 
in London and £7.85 elsewhere in the UK (TUC 2015).  
However there are more subtle changes to the UK labour market as measured by pay, as data from 
Eurofoundii reveals. Using pay as a proxy for job quality then dividing the pay range of jobs into 
quintiles and charting the expansion and contraction of the number and proportion of jobs in each 
quintile over time, Eurofound has been assessing employment restructuring in Member States of the 
EU. Three developments are revealed for the UK: job polarisation, increased non-standard 
employment generally and amongst the worst paid jobs, and UK-born workers benefitting less from 
employment restructuring. 
Undoubtedly job creation has been strong in the UK post-crisis; almost every quarter over the past 
few years the UK Government’s Office for National Statistics reports a record number of people in 
work (https://www.ons.gov.uk/). The type of jobs being created though is worrying. Unlike many 
other EU Member States, the UK labour market shows a stubborn trend of polarisation. Whilst some 
other EU Members States’ employment has recovered and even upgraded, the polarisation of UK 
jobs has been steady and acute with and post-crisis. Chart 1 below shows job growth in the bottom 
and top quintiles, making the UK economy one of good and bad jobs by pay – or lovely and lousy 
jobs to use Goos and Manning’s (2003) phrase. Significantly, this trend dates back as far back as the 
1970s, according to Eurofound (2015). Reflecting this trend, wage inequality in the UK (as measured 
by the Gini index) has become so great since 2008 that it distorts the EU average; stripping out the 
UK results the EU average ‘remained more or less stable’ according to Eurofound (2016b: 78). 
Chart 1: Net employment change by job-wage quintile EU and UK 2011-14 (1000s) 
 
Source: Eurofound (2015) 
There have also been subtle shifts in the types of status in the jobs created since the crisis, with the 
creation of more ‘non-standard’ jobs or what Eurofound terms ‘core employment’ (2016b: 23). As 
Chart 2 below shows, permanent, full-time jobs have been lost, replaced by part-time and self-
employment. Over half of UK jobs growth to 2014 was accounted for by self-employment. In the 
three months prior to the referendum 88% of new ‘jobs’ were created through self-employment.  It 
is this self-employment that keeps unemployment low in the UK (ONS 2016b). 
Chart 2: changes to UK employment 2008-2014
 
Source: Bank of England (2014) 
Self-employment now accounts for 15 per cent of the UK workforce. Construction workers, taxi 
drivers/chauffeurs and carpenters/joiners were the ‘top 3 roles’ (ONS 2014). As the Office for 
National Statistics has recognised more recently, the growth of self-employment since the crisis is an 
outcome of the flight from unemployment and a shift from other forms of employment. Much of the 
latter is enforced. For example, since the economic crisis the number of jobs in public sector 
education increased by five per cent but the number of self-employed jobs in education rose by 58%. 
A similar pattern has occurred in health. What is significant is that this self-employment is provided 
through temporary work agencies which have contracts to provide temporary not permanent 
positions, with workers filling the posts having to be registered as self-employed in order to be 
eligible for placement (Cribb et al. 2014, Coulter 2016).iii Significantly, average weekly earnings 
(excluding bonuses) for employees was £450 a week in June 2014; for figure for the self-employed 
was £207 a week and falling over 20 per cent since the crisis (ONS 2014). As Frances O’Grady, 
General Secretary of the UK’s trade union umbrella organisation the TUC, has remarked: 
While it is good to see more people in work, the huge increase is self-employment raises 
questions about the nature of those jobs. These newly self-employed workers are not all 
budding entrepreneurs. Many don’t chose self-employment, being forced onto contracts 
with fewer rights, less pay and no job security. (quoted in Farrell 2016: np)  
This development is most apparent in the bottom quintile of UK jobs.  Whilst the majority of good 
jobs as measured by pay that have been created over 2011-15 are also good in terms of status – 
being full-time and permanent – the majority of jobs created in the bottom quintile are temporary, 
part-time and self-employed, as Chart 3 below shows. 
Chart 3: Net employment change by job-wage quintile, decomposed by employment type, UK 
2011-15 (1000s) 
 
Source: Eurofound (2015) 
Elsewhere, amongst the formally employed, zero-hours contracts have proliferated. Although 
measurement of it can be difficult, by the end of 2015, the Office for National Statistics estimated 
that just over 800,000 workers were employed on zero hours contracts. These contracts offer no 
guaranteed working hours and, as a consequence, disable income stability for workers and so 
undermine any possibility of a planned life around a solid wage floor. Moreover these jobs are not 
necessary temporary – well over half, 463,000, have been employed on these contracts for more 
than a year, some more than five years (ONS 2016). 
In addition, who works in jobs in the bottom quintile is emerging as a problem in the UK. 
Im/migration within the EU is significant: in 2015 around 26 million workers or 12 per cent of 
workers were born in a country different to that in which they now live and work. It increased by 
two million over 2011-15. Within the EU most flows come from the new, poorer EU Member States 
to the old, richer ones (Eurofound 2016). By 2015 just over 10 per cent of the UK workforce was not 
born in the UK (ONS 2015). These workers spread across the quintiles but the largest proportion is 
employed in the bottom quintile – accounting for just over 20 percent of workers in this pay group 
(Eurofound 2016b).  
Chart 2: Net employment change by job-wage quintile, decomposed by country of birth category 
for the EU and UK, 2011-15, (1000s) 
  
Source: Eurofound (2016b); Hurley (2016). The EU15= the old Members States to 2004, the EU13 = 
the new Member States from 2004. 
As Chart 4 above shows, across the EU and in the UK native workers (those born in the reporting 
country) have benefited most from good jobs growth in the top quantile. But there are also 
differences.  Across the EU generally, native workers have tended to move out of the lower quintile 
jobs; by contrast in the UK native workers have remained in these jobs. A bad jobs trap thus still 
exists in the UK. Almost three-quarters of workers who were low paid in 2002 were still low paid in 
2012 (Hurrell 2013 cf. Booth and Snower 1996). Moreover jobs growth in intermediate jobs, those in 
the middle quintile and which include skilled work, is almost exclusively dominated by non-native 
workers. Fr the last twenty years in an effect to create a knowledge-driven economy in the UK higher 
education has been boosted at the expense of the vocational education and training that underpins 
many of the intermediate jobs (Warhurst and Thompson 2006; Anderson 2009). With no 
springboard up into better jobs, UK native are benefitting less from employment restructuring and 
work more alongside non-native workers in bad jobs than in the EU generally. Thirty per cent of 
workers in hotels and restaurants are im/migrants for example (Butler 2016). Whether direct 
competition between native and non-native workers is real or imaginary, poorer, less educated 
workers with fewest resources and little hope of improvement might feel that their cake, such as it 
is, is now having to be shared with others.       
The ability to hear voices is common sense not madness  
Brexit may have been accidental but it was an accident waiting to happen. The UK has been good at 
creating jobs post-crisis but the quality of those jobs has been ignored by the Government. Too 
many bad jobs are being created and the terms and conditions of these bad jobs are getting worse 
(cf. Carre et al. 2012) and too many UK born workers are getting stuck in these jobs. Although the 
analysis presented here is crude and the data certainly needs closer examination, these bad job 
developments seem to have impacted voting behaviour in the referendum, particularly amongst the 
lowest skilled. 
 It should be noted that the rest of the EU has no inherent immunity to some of the employment 
developments experienced by the UK. Across the EU, latest available data shows that net 
employment growth has occurred in the bottom three quintiles. One reading is that the recovery is 
replacing the type of jobs lost during the crisis; another reading is that the recovery is based on the 
creation of lower quality jobs (Eurofound 2016a). 
 The morning after the night before, the reaction of many to the Brexit result was to seek to have the 
referendum re-run: over four million people signed a petition asking for a second referendum.iv That 
demand sought to deny the voice of those who have voted to leave. Others wanted to have the 
referendum result binned, citing it to merely be advisory and wanting Parliament to assert its 
sovereignty and ignore the result. Others want a second referendum on the negotiated exit deal. 
Regardless which occurs, it is imperative that the voice of those who voted Brexit is heard and 
understood.  
Replacing Cameron and sacking Osborne, in her first speech as the new UK Prime Minister, Teresa 
May recognised that ‘If you’re from an ordinary working class family, life is much harder than many 
people in Westminster realise.’ Her government, she said, will ‘be driven, not by the interests of the 
privileged few but by yours’ (quoted in Perkins 2016). At the moment May’s approach remains 
rhetorical; policies have yet to developed that might translate into practice and evidence her 
commitment to hearing and learning from those who voted to leave the EU. However words do have 
affect; first, a yardstick has been created by which to measure the new UK Government’s policies 
and their intended and actual outcomes; second, with her speech, space has opened up for 
progressive ideas to be aired around the need for making bad jobs better and the ways in which that 
might be done. 
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Endnotes 
i https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted/ 
ii Eurofound is the agency for improving living and working conditions in the EU. 
iii I am grateful to Lorraine Johnson of IER for this material. 
iv See https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/131215 
                                                          
